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This paper proposes a new instrument for institutional quality—the salary of colonial 
governors—to investigate whether variations in the quality of British colonial rule 
continue to have an impact on the economic performance of former colonies.  Governors’ 
salaries provide a good source of exogenous variation because the ranking of salaries 
across the British Empire remained relatively fixed from the late nineteenth century 
onwards. Perhaps most important, this instrument varies widely across colonies with 
historically low rates of European settlement—that is, most countries in today’s 
developing world.  Using a two-stage least squares estimation procedure, I find that 
colonies with higher paid governors developed better institutions (and higher per capita 
income) than colonies with lower paid governors.   
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Many economists argue that institutional quality plays a key role in explaining 
differences in per capita income across the world.  North (1990) emphasizes the 
importance of legal institutions which secure property rights and enable people to make 
contracts and resolve disputes.  Legal institutions foster economic growth by encouraging 
people to invest in themselves and in different forms of physical capital, increasing rates 
of factor accumulation.  Other economists (La Porta et al, 1998, 1999; Rauch and Evans, 
2000; Djankov et al, 2002, 2003) highlight the role of political institutions—particularly 
the quality of government— in fostering economic development.  Good government is 
often linked to greater public good provision, less intrusive regulation, effective 
government spending, and lower income inequality. 
While most economists would agree that good institutions promote economic 
development, less agreement exists on how some countries end up with effective 
institutions while others do not.  To tackle this issue, economists have examined the role 
of history in determining the quality of present-day institutions.  Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
2002), for example, argue that variations in current institutional quality are strongly 
correlated to historical patterns of European migration.  Countries that attracted large 
numbers of Europeans during the 16
th and 17
th centuries (i.e., countries with relatively 
low rates of settler mortality) developed European-style institutions which, inter alia, 
protected property rights.  By contrast, countries with less welcoming environments (i.e., 
countries with relatively high rates of settler mortality) ended up with extractive states 
and weak property rights. 
  2Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) also highlight the role of geography in 
explaining why some countries developed better institutions than others.  They argue that 
current levels of income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean can be traced 
back to the colonial institutions which were set up to support small, European elites.  
These regions attracted Europeans because they had environments conducive to growing 
profitable crops—like sugar and tobacco.  Using slave labor, Europeans produced huge 
crops for export while maintaining their own elite status through strict restrictions on 
migration.  Consequently, these regions developed hierarchical societies, largely as a 
result of their initial factor endowments.          
Geographic factors, however, are not the only source of variation related to 
institutional quality (although they are frequently used because they are a good source of 
exogenous variation).  During the second wave of colonization (c. 1850 to 1914) the 
European powers set up a wide range of political structures in the colonies they ruled.  To 
a large extent, these political structures were designed by the early colonial governors—
the ‘man on the spot’— and not by any centralized authority within the colonizing 
country.  Colonial governors were given a great deal of de facto independence from the 
governments they represented and were rarely questioned or recalled unless a major 
policy failure occurred
1.  As a result, these colonies adopted many different forms of 
political institutions.   
It was during this period that most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia were brought under colonial rule.  Given their tropical (or sub-tropical) climates, 
these countries did not develop large European settlements.  Nevertheless they inherited a 
                                                 
1 Such autonomy had not existed during the previous two centuries when colonial powers practiced a more 
centralized form of colonial rule. 
  3wide range of colonial institutions—from highly extractive institutions (e.g., the Belgium 
Congo) to relatively strong institutions which insured the protection of property rights 
(e.g., Singapore).  Today these regions contain a number of economic ‘winners’—
countries like Hong Kong, Malta, Singapore, and the Seychelles—as well as some of 
development’s biggest ‘losers’—countries like Cambodia, Nigeria, and Zambia which are 
poorer today than they were thirty years ago.    
  How can we explain these divergent paths of economic development?   In this 
paper, I argue that much of this divergence can be explained by variations in the quality 
of early colonial rule.  Specifically, colonies that were sent ‘higher quality’ governors 
developed stronger property rights and rule-of-law than colonies that were sent ‘lower 
quality’ governors.  To measure the impact of institutional quality on per capita income, I 
propose a new instrument—the salary of colonial governors—which is correlated to a 
colony’s past institutional quality but not to its initial level of economic development.   
This instrument provides a good source of exogenous variation in the British 
Empire because the ranking of governors’ salaries across colonies remained relatively 
fixed from the late nineteenth century onwards (after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 
when Britain gained the African colonies).  Better governors were sent to better paid 
posts—as designated by the Colonial Office—and installed better institutions in the 
colonies they ruled.  Essentially, the Colonial Office picked the economic ‘winners’ in 
the late nineteenth century by setting up a compensation system in which some 
governorships were better paid than others. 
This instrument has one main advantage over settler mortality rates—the 
instrument proposed by Acemoglu et al (2001) which has become the standard instrument 
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governors’ salaries vary widely across former colonies with low levels of European 
settlement.  Most importantly, it varies across countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia—the two poorest regions in the world.  A central task of development 
economics is to understand why some countries in these regions have begun to develop 
while others remain caught at the subsistence level.   
Most countries in today’s developing world did not attract large numbers of 
Europeans during the second wave of colonization.  In 1900, for example, all fifty 
countries listed in Table 1 had less than ten percent European settlement.  By 1960 these 
countries had taken many different paths toward institutional development and had 
already diverged in terms of per capita income. 
Later in the paper, I present evidence which demonstrates that better paid 
governors were better administrators.  Governors’ salaries are, however, positively 
correlated to current levels of income per capita and institutional quality in countries that 
were former British colonies. Figure 1 plots the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000 
against the logarithm of British governors’ salaries in 1915.  Former colonies that were 
sent higher paid governors are wealthier today than former colonies that were sent lower 
paid governors.  As demonstrated by Figure 2, this relationship becomes even more 
pronounced when the sample is expanded to include countries that were colonized by the 
other major European powers—France, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal
2.   
These simple correlations support the hypothesis that colonies with better paid 
governors developed better institutions.  To demonstrate this relationship, I regress 
                                                 
2 Germany is not included because it lost most of its colonies after World War I.  Former German colonies 
are classified by the identity of their new colonizer.  For example, Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania) 
became a colony of Britain and is therefore classified as “British.”   
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governors’ salaries. Two new datasets (collected by the author) are used for analysis: the 
first includes the salaries of British colonial governors for the period 1880 to 1935; the 
second expands the dataset to include the salaries of governors posted to other European 
colonies but it covers only one year: 1913. 
The two-stage least squares estimate of the impact of institutions on per capita 
income is large in magnitude and highly significant.  It suggests, for example, that if 
Nigeria (the former British colony with the weakest institutions) were to strengthen its 
rule of law to the level of Singapore (the former British colony with the strongest 
institutions), its per capita income would increase by a factor of 44.  This result remains 
significant, even after controlling for a country’s latitude, ethnic diversity, and region.  In 
addition, several methods are used to check the results for robustness, particularly reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias.  These tests provide further evidence that the quality 
of colonial rule during the early twentieth century is an important determinant of present-
day institutions and economic performance. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the data set used in 
analysis and provides some historical background on why governors’ salaries are an 
appropriate instrument for institutional quality.  Section 3 presents OLS regressions and 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions of GDP per capita on an index of institutional 
quality.  Section 4 investigates the robustness of the IV results, and finally Section 5 
explains how this research contributes to the existing literature on comparative 
development.  
 
  62. Measuring the Quality of Colonial Rule  
The primary data used for analysis come from The Dominions Office and Colonial List 
which is an annual publication compiled by the British Colonial Office.  This publication 
provides information, including salary, for nearly all British governors appointed after 
1880.  There are a few omissions: the salary of the Vice-Roy of India is not included and 
only a few salaries of administrators in territories classified as British protectorates are 
listed
3.  Nevertheless, these data provide a rich source of information on the quality of 
colonial officers posted to different colonies across the British Empire.   
The first pattern to emerge from these data is the large variation in British 
governors’ salaries.  In 1912 the lowest paid governor earned about ₤1,200 per annum, 
while the highest paid governor (outside India) earned more than ₤10,000.  The average 
salary of a colonial governor, however, was high relative to that paid to other civil 
servants.  In 1935, for example, the average salary of a British Ambassador posted abroad 
was ₤1,960, while the average salary of a British colonial governor was ₤4,733.
4   
The second important pattern to note is that British governors were paid more 
than their European counterparts.  According to Gann and Duignan (1978, Table 13, p. 
158), the British Governor of Nigeria was paid ₤7,500 in 1913—more than three times 
the salary of both the French Governor-General of West Africa (₤2,469) and the 
Portuguese Governor-general of Angola (₤2,200).  The fact that British governors were 
paid more than their European counterparts coincides with other research which 
                                                 
3 India was not linked to the Colonial Office—it had its own department.  According to Gann and Duignan 
(1978) the Vice-Roy of India was the highest paid government official in Britain.  In 1913 the Vice-Roy 
was paid £17,500 which was substantially more than the British Prime Minister who earned £10,000.    
4 Average diplomatic salaries are computed from the salaries listed in the Foreign Office List and 
Diplomatic Consular Year Book for 1935 published by the British Government.  The average salary for 
colonial governors does not include the salary of the Vice-Roy of India. 
  7demonstrates that British colonies developed better institutions than European colonies.  
La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), for example, argue that former British colonies have stronger 
property rights today because they adopted the British legal system of common law rather 
than the European system of civil-law.  In a similar vein, Djankov et al. (2002, 2003) find 
evidence that former British colonies have less intrusive regulatory systems and more 
expedient dispute resolution than other former colonies.  And finally, Bertocchi and 
Canova (2002) estimate the growth effects of having Britain rather than another European 
power as a colonizer.  According to their results, former British colonies grew, on 
average, 1.1% faster than other colonies over the period 1960 to 1988. 
Previous studies also highlight the important influence which individual political 
leaders can have on economic performance.  Jones and Olken (2005), for example, 
analyze data from 57 countries where the national leader died unexpectedly from natural 
causes or an accident.  They find significant changes in the growth rates of countries 
when there was a change in leadership, particularly in countries where the government 
was autocratic.  These results complement the large literature which stresses the 
importance of executive constraints that hold back the “predatory” nature of the state.  
This literature argues that the state should be strong enough to maintain political order 
and protect citizens’ property but not so strong that it becomes the violator itself.    
British colonial governors had few formal constraints on their behavior but did 
not, as a rule, act in a predatory manner.  This raises an important question: why didn’t 
British governors resort to rent-seeking and other forms of predatory behavior so 
common today in countries with weak institutions?  My answer is that British governors 
were more interested in career-building than rent-seeking.  Support for this answer can be 
  8found from several different sources: economic theory, historical studies, and the colonial 
data.  In terms of theory, Alesina and Tabellini (2006) argue that the main difference 
between politicians and bureaucrats is how they are held accountable.  While politicians 
are held accountable at the ballot box (i.e., how well their performance ‘pleased’ the 
voters), bureaucrats are motivated by career concerns (i.e., how well their performance 
fulfilled the goals of their organization and increased their probability of promotion).   
Historical studies provide indirect evidence that British governors were highly 
motivated by career advancement. In most cases, the men who became governors were 
career bureaucrats who had worked their way up through the ranks of the Colonial Office 
by performing well on previous assignments.  Typically, candidates for governor were 
drawn from the existing pool of colonial administrators, although some governors were 
appointed from the military establishment.  According to Kirk-Green (1981, p. 15-16), 
the nomination process was relatively straight forward:   
A short-list of likely candidates would be drawn up by the Personnel Department 
of the Colonial Office from their list ‘A’ of up-and-coming men.  Pros and cons 
against each name were derived from a synthesis of the confidential reports 
submitted annually from the Governor of each territory on each of his officials.  
The final nomination went forward from a small Whitehall committee, chaired by 
the Permanent Under Secretary of the Colonial Office, to the Secretary of State, 
and was referred to the Prime Minister and sometimes the Sovereign in case of 
objection… on average some twenty to thirty years elapsed before elevation to a 
governorship to the fortunate few who made the top.   
 
Therefore, it was difficult to advance to the top of the Colonial Service without playing 
by the rules of the game.   
In addition, the structure of pension payouts provided a strong incentive to follow 
the rules and regulations of the Colonial Service.  The maximum pension that a governor 
could receive was granted after ten years of service which meant there was a great deal of 
  9pressure to be appointed to a second governorship.  No exceptions were granted, even in 
cases of poor health or elevated age.  But perhaps most important, Cain and Hopkins 
(2001) present evidence that British colonial officers formed a ‘gentlemanly’ class bound 
together by a strict social code in which they ardently believed in the virtues of colonial 
rule.   
There is certainly evidence from the colonial data that the men who became 
governors were successful at creating reputations of high standing in the public sector.  
Most governors at the time of their appointment had already received one of Britain’s 
highest civil honors.  There was a strict ranking of British orders—the two highest 
carrying the status of knighthood
5.  As demonstrated in Figure 3, the colonial data show a 
strong, positive relationship between the level of governors’ salaries and the number of 
civil honors held at the time of appointment
6.  
The British governors ruled a large proportion of what today has become the 
developing world.  By the end of the nineteenth century, Britain controlled nearly one-
fifth of the world’s total land.  Next in importance came France which only controlled 
about 4% of the world’s land, followed by Belgium and Italy (each controlled less than 
0.5%).  All the European powers (except Germany) expanded their holdings during the 
early decades of the twentieth century. By 1933 the European powers together ruled more 
than one-third of the world’s population; Britain alone ruled about one-quarter of the 
world’s population (all figures from Clark, 1936).   
                                                 
5 The top six civil orders are (in descending order of status): (1) Most Noble Order of the Garter; (2) Most 
Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle; (3) Most Illustrious Order of St. Patrick; (4) Order of Bath; 
(5) Order of the Star of India; and (6) Order of St. Michael and St. George.   
6 The civil honors have been weighted by their level of prestige.  Each civil honor receives as its weight the 
order of its ranking.  There are twelve ranks in all (some orders have several classes).  For example, the 
highest honor is “KG” (Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter) which is given a weight of 12.  
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a lasting impact on institutions, I have compiled a data set on the salaries of colonial 
governors who ruled in colonies acquired by the other European powers (France, 
Belgium, Italy, and Portugal).  Some of these salaries had to be extrapolated from 
existing data sources, creating the possibility of measurement error.  Several steps were 
taken to create the larger data set.  All several salaries (denominated in British pounds) 
are based on the data listed by Gann and Duignan (1978).   
For those colonies with missing data, I used the Gann and Duignan data to match 
salaries to administrators with the same ranking.  For example, the Portuguese Governor-
general of Angola earned a salary of £2,200 in 1913 while the salary for Mozambique 
was missing.  Since these countries were acquired by Portugal at the same time and are 
physically near to each other, I assign Angola’s salary to Portugal’s governor.  Outside 
the British Empire, colonies were ruled by different ranking officials (e.g., Governor-
general, Governor, Governor 1
st class Governor 2
nd class, etc).  Gann and Duignan 
include data for different classes of administrators.  For all colonies with missing data, I 
use Henige’s (1970) Colonial Governors: A Comprehensive List to determine the class of 
colonial officer in charge of the colony.  I then match the salary data to administrators 
with the same rank. 
Table 2 provides a list of the 42 British colonies and the 25 European colonies                              
used for analysis.  In this table, I include the identity of the colonizer, political status, date 
of acquisition, date of independence, type of governor (‘high quality’ versus ‘low 
quality’), and income per capita in 2000.  I define ‘high quality’ governors as those who 
earned an annual income of more than ₤3000 in 1913; ‘low quality’ governors had annual 
  11incomes below ₤3000
7.  Please note that these countries do not represent the population 
of all European colonies.  In my analysis, I include only those colonies which: (1) 
remained under colonial rule for more 30 years or more; and (2) were not ruled by more 
than one European power at the same time.  The first restriction excludes countries, like 
Egypt, which came under formal British control for only a short period of time.  The 
rationale for this exclusion is that institutions are permanent in nature and therefore take 
time to build.  The second restriction excludes countries, like the Sudan and Equatorial 
Guinea, which were jointly ruled by two European powers.          
The remaining data used for analysis are taken from existing data sources.   
Definitions of each variable and their source can be found in Appendix I.  Table 3 
provides descriptive statistics for several variables of key interest.  The first column 
covers the sample of 42 British colonies for which data on governors’ salaries and 
institutional quality are available.  This is the preferred sample, given that it contains a 
longer series of data on governors’ salaries, as well as several additional variables on the 
personal background and administrative effectiveness of British governors.  The second 
column contains the summary statistics of the larger sample which includes data on both 
British and European colonies.   
GDP per capita on a PPP basis for 2000 is the measure used for economic 
performance.  There is considerable variation in GDP per capita across both samples.  For 
the former British colonies, mean GDP in 2000 is $9,888 and the standard deviation of 
                                                 
7 For the British data the following salaries were deflated to 1912 prices: Tanzania (1921), Zambia (1925), 
and Zimbabwe (1925).  These dates correspond to the first year that the governors’ salaries were included 
in the Colonial List.  To express these salaries in 1912 prices, I use the deflators listed in Mitchell (1988).  
In addition, several salaries had to be converted to pounds sterling: Canada and Belize were expressed in 
gold dollars; India, Uganda, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and the Seychelles were expressed in rupees; 
and both Malaysia, and Singapore were expressed in silver dollars.  To convert these salaries, I used the 
exchange rates listed in Colonial Office (1937).           
  12log GDP is 1.19. The poorest country in the sample is Sierra Leone with a mean GDP of 
$684 and the richest country is Bermuda with a mean GDP of $34, 032.  For the larger 
sample, mean income is $7,115 and the standard deviation of log GDP is 1.24.  In this 
sample, the poorest country is Zaire with a mean GDP of $359 and the richest country is 
Bermuda again. 
To measure current institutions, I use two variables—“rule-of-law” and 
“government effectiveness”— defined by Kaufman et al. (2003).  Both variables range 
from -2.5 (weakest institutions) to +2.5 (strongest institutions).  “Rule-of-law” varies 
according to indicators like the extent of tax evasion, police effectiveness, and how well 
financial assets and wealth are protected, whereas “government effectiveness” varies 
according to the efficiency of the country’s bureaucracy, particularly its ability to collect 
tax revenue, implement government policies, and respond effectively to domestic 
economic problems.  I choose the Kaufman et al. measures of institutional quality over 
those defined by Jaggers et al (2002) because the former cover more countries.   
In the British sample, the mean value for “rule-of-law” is 0.25, with Nigeria 
(score of -1.09) having the weakest institutions and Singapore (score of 2.12) having the 
strongest institutions.  The mean value for the larger sample is -0.11, with Zaire (score of 
-1.79) having the weakest institutions and, once again, Singapore having the strongest 
institutions.  The former colonies vary widely in how they score on “government 
effectiveness.”  In the British sample, the mean value for “government effectiveness” is 
0.19, with Sierra Leone (score of -1.57) having the least effective government and 
Singapore (score of 2.48) having the most effective.  The mean value for the larger 
  13sample is -0.09, with Zaire (score of -1.63) and the Congo (score of -1.62) having the 
lowest scores and, once again, Singapore having the highest score. 
Two other controls are added to the equations: (1) the level of ethnic diversity; 
and (2) the distance of the country from the equator.  Previous empirical studies have 
found that ethnic diversity is negatively correlated to income per capita (see, for example, 
Easterly and Levine, 1997; and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  In this study, I use 
the measure of ethnic diversity employed by La Porta et al. (1999) which corresponds to 
the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization: that is, the probability that two random 
selected people from the same country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group.  
This variable varies from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating greater ethnic diversity.  
The mean value of ethnic diversity for both samples is similar: 0.41 for the former British 
colonies and 0.44 for the larger sample.   
In addition, the equations estimated include the country’s distance from the 
equator (defined in terms of the absolute value of the latitude of the country).  This 
variable is intended to control for adverse geographic factors, like being located in the 
tropics.  Several studies have found that a tropical location has a negative impact on 
income per capita, apparently resulting from the higher disease burden in tropical 
climates (see, for example, Easterly and Levine, 2003 and Gallop et al., 1999).            
  
3. OLS and IV Results in the Core Specifications 
This paper attempts to estimate of the following equation: 
i i LAT ETH INS y ε γ ρ β α + + + + = log  
  14where yi is the income per capita in country i, ,  , and   measure the quality 
of institutions, level of ethnic diversity, and latitude of country i, respectively, and ε
i INS i ETH i LAT
i is 
the random error term.  My main interest is in the size and significance of β, after 
controlling for ethnic diversity and ecological conditions (measured by a country’s 
latitude).   
Before discussing the results, it is useful to examine the simple bivariate 
relationships between present-day institutions and governors salaries.  As demonstrated 
by Figures 4 and 5, the rule of law variable is positively correlated with the log of 
governors’ salaries in both samples and, consequently, has the potential to explain levels 
of per capita income.  In the larger sample, governors’ salaries alone explain 
approximately 30% of the variation in present-day institutions, as measured by the rule of 
law variable.  This positive relationship is confirmed by the OLS regression of (log) per 
capita income on the rule-of-law measure.  Panel C of Table 4 reports OLS estimates of β 
for the different samples.  The estimated value of β is precise and large in magnitude: its 
estimated value is 0.79 for the British colonies and 1.00 for the larger sample which 
includes countries colonized by other European powers.   
Similar results are found for government effectiveness.  Governors’ salaries are 
positively correlated with present-day levels of government performance (see Figures 6 
and 7), indicating that the quality of early colonial rule had a lasting impact on the type of 
bureaucracy which evolved in the former colonies.  Rauch and Evans (2000) reveal that 
effective bureaucrats in developing countries run better governments.  That is, developing 
countries with strong bureaucratic structures (e.g., recruitment based on meritocracy) 
have less corruption and more efficient regulatory environments than countries with weak 
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bureaucratic structures while others did not. One possibility is that colonial rule 
influenced the structure of early state bureaucracies and these structures became the 
foundation for later state institutions.  This hypothesis is consistent with the results from 
the OLS regression of (log) per capita income on government effectiveness. 
 As is well known, the OLS results cannot be interpreted as either causative or 
accurate for a number of reasons, including omitted variables, reverse causality, and 
measurement error.  To tackle these problems, I employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation method which uses (log) governors’ salaries as an instrument for institutional 
quality.   
In the first-stage regressions,   is regressed on all the exogenous variables.  
That is,  
i INS
INSi i i i i LAT ETH LNSALARY INS ε σ φ λ η + + + + =  
where  LNSALARYi  is (log) governors’ salaries.  The exclusion restriction is that 
LNSALARYi  does not appear in equation (1).  Equations (1) and (2) are the core 
specifications.  Panel A of Table 4 reports the 2SLS results for the different samples.  
Three samples are used for analysis: the first two are based on the British colonies, and 
the third includes both British and European colonies.  In columns (3) through (6) India 
and Pakistan are dropped from the sample.  These countries are dropped for two reasons: 
(1) because they are outliers in terms of governor pay; and (2) the Indian sub-continent 
was not entirely under British control—many states remained under control of Indian 
rulers (i.e., the Princely States).   
  16Panel A of Table 4 reports the β estimates for institutional quality. The results 
reported in columns (3) to (6) indicate that better institutions have a positive impact on 
economic performance.  When governors’ salaries are used as an instrument for rule-of-
law, the β estimates range from 1.17 to 1.48.  These estimates are similar in magnitude to 
those found by Rodrik et al (2004) who use the same measure of institutions (rule of law) 
but a different set of instruments.  Rodrik et al. use two instruments: (1) rates of settler 
mortality (proposed by Acemoglu et al, 2001); and (2) the fraction of the population 
speaking English and other Western languages (proposed by Hall and Jones, 1999)
8.  
Their 2SLS estimates of the impact of institutional quality on economic performance 
range from 1.19 to 1.78.   
My results corroborate these earlier 2SLS estimates and provide further evidence 
that a country’s history can have a lasting impact on its economic performance.  The real 
question, of course, is why does history matter?  Did colonialism really affect how 
institutions evolved in these countries?  The remainder of this paper investigates this 
question by checking the validity of the instrument and the robustness of the results. 
 
4. Checking the Results 
The validity of the 2SLS estimates reported in Table 4 depends on the assumption 
that governors’ salaries have no direct impact on current economic performance.  To test 
this assumption, I use a several different approaches.  First, I employ Sargan’s (1958) test 
of overidentifying restrictions.  This test is carried out by adding instruments to the first-
stage regression, and then testing the regressors for exogeneity.  Sargan’s test asks 
                                                 
8 They use the Hall and Jones (1999) instrument because it covers a much larger sample (137 countries) 
than is possible using the Acemoglu et al.(2001) instrument (67 countries).   
  17whether any of the instruments are invalid but assumes that there are enough valid 
instruments to exactly identify the equation.  By failing to reject the null hypothesis, we 
know that at least one of the instruments is valid.  The overidentifying test is useful 
because it provides a direct test of the exclusion restriction.  The test, of course, is not 
full-proof: (1) it may not lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis if all instruments are 
invalid but correlated to each other; and (2) it does not verify the validity of all the 
instruments.  Nevertheless, it is a useful starting point in determining whether 
governors’s salaries are a valid instrument.   
The Sargan test is carried out by adding three additional instruments to the first-
stage equation.  Two instruments indicate the identity of the colonizer—that is, whether 
the colony was acquired by the British or the French. Several studies demonstrate that 
colonial origin is important in determining the quality of a country’s laws and their 
enforcement (La Porta et al, 1998, 1999; Djankov, 2002).  The last instrument identifies 
whether the colony came under colonial rule after 1850.  This dummy is added because 
colonial governors had more discretion in the types of institutions adopted by colonies 
acquired after the mid-nineteenth century.   
The results of the overidentification tests are reported in Table 5.  In Panel A of 
this table, I report the 2SLS estimates of the effect of institutional quality on per capita 
income using different sets of instruments.  Panel B gives the corresponding first stage 
results and Panel C gives the p-value from Χ
2 test statistic.  When the number of 
instruments is expanded, the exogeneity of the over-identifying restrictions cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level.  This holds true when I test the exclusion restriction for both the 
rule of law instrument and the government effectiveness instrument.  The failure to reject 
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are a valid instrument. 
In addition, I examine the stability of the instrument over time. Institutions, by 
definition, are slow to change because they define both how people act (based on the 
structure of incentives) and how they expect others will act.  Although political leaders 
can change overnight and radically alter public policy, the new leaders must still operate 
within the existing institutional environment.  Therefore, a good instrument for 
institutions should be stable across different time periods because institutions are 
relatively durable.  This aspect of institutions has been largely ignored by economists, 
mainly due to data constraints.
9   
One advantage of the British colonial data is that I have data on governors’ 
salaries covering the period 1885 to 1935.  I use these data to examine the stability of the 
2SLS estimates over different time periods.  These results are reported in Table 6. With 
the exception of 1895, the 2SLS estimates are relatively stable over time—they vary from 
0.92 to 1.17 for the rule of law variable, and from 0.82 to 1.02 for the government 
effectiveness variable.  This corresponds to a change of about 25 percent using data 
which span thirty years.   
 Assuming the instrument is valid, the 2SLS estimates could still be biased if there 
is an omitted variable correlated with either the exogenous variables (i.e., the second-
stage regressors) or the endogenous variables (i.e., the first stage regressors).  Both 
possibilities are examined.  First, I investigate the possibility that some missing variable 
(correlated to institutional quality) is the true determinant of economic performance.  To 
do this, I add regional dummies which are known to be correlated to economic 
                                                 
9 The exception is the paper by Glaeser et al (2004). 
  19performance.  These results are reported in Table 7.  The addition of regional controls 
does not significantly affect the size of the coefficients.  For both samples, the 2SLS 
estimates remain significant and relatively stable.  However, the F-statistic drops 
significantly in the first-stage regression in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), indicating that 
governors’ salaries are a weak instrument for government effectiveness.  Given this 
result, I restrict the remainder of my analysis to the rule of law variable. 
    Next, I investigate the possibility of omitted variables bias in the first stage 
equation; that is, the likelihood that some missing variable (correlated to governors’ 
salaries) is the true determinant of institutional quality.  This type of omitted variable bias 
is harder to detect.  Once again, I use a couple of different approaches.  First, I regress the 
rule of law variable on the salary of British Diplomats in 1935.  Why?  Because the 
selection process to become a British Ambassador was similar to the selection process to 
become British Colonial Governor.  However, there is no a priori reason why British 
Ambassadors would have had any impact on the quality of institutions in the countries 
where they were posted.  In other words, there should be no correlation between 
diplomatic salaries and present day institutions.  The data confirm this hypothesis.  When 
the rule of law variable is estimated on a dummy variable indicating whether the 
Ambassador received a “high” salary, the estimated coefficient is 0.38 with a standard 
error of 0.32 which corresponds to a significance level of 24 percent
10.  In addition, the 
overall fit of the equation indicates that “high” ambassador salaries explain only 0.3 
percent of the variation in the rule of law variable.  These results are reported in Table 8.  
                                                 
10 In 1935, there were four salaries for British diplomats.  These were ₤1,350, ₤1,900, ₤2, 137, or ₤2,375.  I 
define “high” salaries as those exceeding ₤2,000 per annum. 
  20Next, I investigate whether better paid governors obtained more colonial funding.  
If this were the case, governors’ salaries may be capturing the effect of larger colonial 
investment rather than higher quality institutions. As a rule, British colonies were 
supposed to maintain balanced budgets,
11 but could obtain additional funding from the 
British Government to finance special projects, like railroads or new ports. To test 
whether higher paid governors obtained more funding, I use data on the allocation of 
colonial funds and grants by the Colonial Development Advisory Committee during the 
inter-war period.  The Colonial Development Act of 1929:  
established a fund of up to ₤1 million a year to be spent on colonial development 
and a committee, known as the Colonial Development Advisory Committee 
(C.D.A.C.) was established to consider schemes submitted by local colonial 
governments via the Colonial Office, for assistance.  It was this committee which 
was formally responsible in the 1930’s for channeling imperial funds for 
economic development in the colonies (Meredith, 1975, p. 487).        
 
To obtain funds, governors had to submit applications which outlined both the 
costs and purpose of their proposed plan.  There was considerable variation across the 
colonies as to the number of applications submitted and their eventual success rate in 
obtaining colonial funds.  Using data collected by Meredith (1975), I investigate whether 
higher paid governors: 1) submitted more applications to the C.D.A.C.; 2) had a higher 
success rate; and 3) obtained greater funds and grants.  These variables are regressed on 
governors’ salaries and the results are reported in Table 8.  The results indicate that 
higher paid governors did not submit more applications nor have a higher success rate.  
And, higher paid governors did not, on average, receive more external funding for 
colonial investments.  Therefore, it is unlikely that governors’ salaries are picking up the 
effect of larger colonial investment.      
                                                 
11 Tax payers back in the colonizing country didn’t want to have to pay for colonial development. 
  21And, finally, I investigate the possibility of reverse causality; that is, higher paid 
colonial governors were placed in colonies with initially higher per capita income.  While 
no national accounts exist for these countries during the pre-colonial period, it is possible 
to proxy economic development using population density.
12  Using colonial data, I have 
measures of population density for the British colonies in 1861 which are derived from 
various colonial population censuses
13.  To determine whether higher paid governors 
were sent to colonies with initially higher levels of economic development, I regress 
population density on governors’ salaries for six years of colonial data (1895, 1905, 1913, 
1925, 1930, and 1935).  The results from these regressions are reported in Table 9.  From 
these results, it is clear that higher quality governors were not placed in colonies that 
were initially more developed (at least, not during the first forty years of colonial rule).      
 
5. Conclusion 
Several recent studies have examined how colonial institutions are related to current 
institutions and economic performance.  The earliest of these studies focused on 
differences in institutional quality based on the identity of the colonizer.  These studies 
demonstrate that, on average, former British colonies developed better institutions than 
other European colonies.  A major shortcoming of this work, however, is that it neglects 
differences in colonial institutions across colonies ruled by the same colonial power.  The 
innovative paper by Acemoglu et al (2001) resolved this problem (as well as the 
econometric issue that institutions are endogenous) by proposing a new instrument for 
institutional quality—settler mortality rates.  The main weakness of this instrument, 
                                                 
12 Population density is often used by economic historians as a proxy for economic development—higher 
levels of population density correspond to higher levels of economic development. 
13 Population estimates are divided by the land area of the colony. 
  22however, is that it does not vary significantly across former colonies with low levels of 
European settlement.  These former colonies include many of today’s economic 
‘winners’ (e.g., Hong Kong, Malaysia) as well as some of the developing world’s worst 
performers (e.g., Nigeria, Zambia).     
To overcome this problem, I propose a new instrument—the salary of colonial 
governors— for measuring the quality of colonial institutions.  This instrument provides 
a good source of exogenous variation because the ranking of governors’ salaries in the 
British Empire remained relatively fixed from the late nineteenth century onwards.   
Using a two-stage least squares estimation procedure, I find that colonies which had 
higher paid governors developed better institutions (and higher per capita income) than 
those with lesser paid governors.  To confirm these results, I conduct several checks 
which include tests for omitted variable bias and reverse causality, as well as tests to 
validate the stability of the instrument over time.  These tests provide strong evidence 
that colonies with better paid governors—as designated by the Colonial Office—ended 
up with better institutions and higher per capita incomes.   
Essentially, the Colonial Office picked the economic ‘winners’ in the late 
nineteenth century by setting up a compensation system in which some governorships 
were better paid than others. This relationship holds outside the British Empire as well.  
When the sample is expanded to include former colonies from other European powers 
(i.e., France, Belgium, Portugal, and Italy), the data indicate that colonies with higher 
paid governors developed better institutions, particularly rule-of-law, than colonies with 
lesser paid governors. 
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Figure 2: Income and Quality of Colonial Rule
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Figure 6: Government Effectiveness and Log Governors' Salarie
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Figure 7: Government Effectiveness and Log Governors' Salarie
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TABLE 1: GDP PER CAPITA IN 1960 






(between $1,650 and $3,400) 
Bangladesh Mali  Angola 
Benin  Morocco  Central African Republic 
Burkina Faso  Mozambique  Guinea 
Burundi Nepal Hong  Kong 
Cameroon Niger  Iran 
Chad Nigeria  Jamaica 
China Pakistan  Japan 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Rwanda  Malaysia 
Cote d’Ivoire  Sierra Leone  Papua New Guinea 
Egypt Sri  Lanka  Philippines 
Ethiopia Syria  Senegal 
Ghana Taiwan  Singapore 
India Tanzania  Tunisia 
Indonesia Thailand  Turkey 
Kenya Togo   
Korea, Rep.  Uganda   
Madagascar Zambia   
Malawi Zimbabwe   
Source: Krieckhaus, Table 3.1 (p.36) 
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TABLE 2:  















Algeria DZA  France  1830  1962  Low  5,753 
Angola AGO  Portugal  1880  1975  Low  1,975 
Antigua ATG  Britain  1663  1981  Low  14,065 
Australia AUS  Britain  1788  1901  High  25,835 
Bahamas BHS  Britain  1717  1973  Low  19.088 
Barbados BRB  Britain  1663  1966  Low  16,086 
Belize BLZ  Britain  1862  1981 Low  6,014 
Benin BEN  France  1894  1960 Low  1,251 
Bermuda BMU  Britain  1885 ----  High  34,032 
Botswana BWA  Britain  1885 1966  Low  7,256 
Burkino Faso  BFA  France  1919  1960  Low  933 
Burundi BDI  Belgium  1919  1962  Low  699 
Cambodia KHM  France  1863 1949  Low  514 
Canada CAN  Britain  1791  1867  High  26,821 
Cen. Afr. Rep.   CAF  France  1910  1960  Low  945 
Chad TCD  France  1920  1960  Low  830 
Comoros COM  France  1912  1973  Low  1,359 
Congo COG  France  1910  1960  Low  1,286 
Cyprus CYP  Britain  1878  1960  High  20.457 
Dominica DMA  Britain  1783 1978  Low  8,197 
Fiji FJI  Britain  1874  1970  High  4,572 
Gabon GAB  France  1910  1960  Low  10,439 
Gambia GMB  Britain  1821  1965  Low  954 
Ghana GHA  Britain  1821  1957 High  1,392 
Grenada GRD  Britain  1783  1974  Low  5,896 
Guinea GIN  France  1783  1975  Low  2,546 
Guyana GUY  Britain  1814  1966  High  3,733 
Hong Kong  HKG  Britain  1842  1960  High  27,236 
Ivory Coast  CIV  France  1882  1960  Low  2,177 
India IND  Britain  1858  1947  High  2,644 
Jamaica JAM  Britain  1655  1962  High  4,521 
Kenya KEN  Britain  1920  1963 High  1,268 
Laos LAO  France  1893  1949  Low  1,257 
Lesotho LSO  Britain  1868  1966  Low  1,834 
Libya LBY  Italy  1912  1951 Low  10,335 
Madagascar MDG  France  1896  1958  Low  823 
Malawi MWI  Britain  1891  1964  Low  839 
Malaysia MYS  Britain  1874  1963  High  11,406 
Mali MLI  France  1920  1960  Low  1,047 
Malta MLT  Britain  1814  1962 High  18,863 
Mauritania MRT  France 1903  1960  Low 1,521 
Mauritius MUS  Britain  1814 1968  High  15,121 
Morocco MAR  France  1912  1956  Low  3,720 
Mozambique MOZ  Portugal  1891  1975  Low  1,286 
New Zealand  NZL  Britain  1840  1910  High  20,423 
Niger NER  France  1922  1960 Low  807 
Nigeria NGA  Britain  1900  1960  High  1,074 
Pakistan PAL  Britain  1858  1947  High  2,477 
Rwanda RWA  Belgium  1919  1962  Low  1,018 
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Senegal SEN  France  1854  1959  Low  1,571 
Seychelles SYC  Britain  1810 1976  High  10,593 
Sierra Leone  SLE  Britain  1896  1961  Low  684 
Singapore SGP  Britain  1826 1965  High  29,434 
Solomon Is.  SLB  Britain  1893  1978  Low  2,013 
South Africa  ZAF  Britain  1848  1964  High  8,226 
Sri Lanka  LKA  Britain  1815  1972  High  4,047 
St Kitts & Nevis   NNA  Britain  1663  1983  Low  14,393 
St Lucia  LCA  Britain  1814  1979  Low  6,689 
St Vincent   VCT  Britain  1784  1979  Low  7,672 
Swaziland SWZ  Britain  1868 1968  Low  8,517 
Tanzania TZA  Britain  1919  1961  Low 817 
Trinidad   TTO  Britain  1888  1962  High  14,770 
Tunisia TUN  France  1881  1956  Low  6,993 
Uganda UGA  Britain  1893  1962  Low  1,058 
Zaire ZAR  Belgium  1885  1967  Low  359 
Zambia ZMB  Britain  1893  1964  Low  866 
Zimbabwe ZWE  Britain  1893  1980  High  3,256 
Notes:  Governors’ Salaries in 1913 British pounds.  Income per capita in PPP dollars. 
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Observations: 42 40 65 
Notes: 
aVariable has 33 observations; 
bVariable has 34 observations; 
cVariable has 40 observations; 
dVariable has 39 observations.  See Appendix Table I for variable definitions and sources. 
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TABLE 4: 
OLS & IV REGRESSIONS OF INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 


















































































R-squared 0.71  0.63 0.72  0.65 0.61  0.17 



















































































































































Notes: Panel A reports the two-stage least squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2000 (PPP basis) as the 
dependent variable.  Panel B reports the corresponding first-stage regression estimates.  Panel C reports the OLS 
estimates, with robust standard errors.  The OLS regressions also control for ethnic diversity and latitude.  In all 
specifications, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  See Appendix Table I 
for variable definitions and sources. 
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TABLE 5: 
OVERIDENTIFICATION TESTS  






















































































































































































































            















Notes: Panel A reports the two-stage least squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2000 (PPP basis) as the 
dependent variable.  Panel B reports the corresponding first-stage regression estimates.  Panel C reports the p-value for 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient on rule of law (or government effectiveness) in Panel A is the same as when 
instrumented by a larger number of instruments.  All regressions using the British sample have 40 observations; the 
regressions using the Full Sample have 65 observations.  See Appendix Table I for variable definitions and sources. 
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Notes: Columns (2) and (4) refer to the 2SLS estimates instrumented by the variable in column (1).  All 
second-stage regressions control for ethnic diversity and latitude.  All regressions have 40 observations, 
except governors’ salary in 1895 and 1905.  The 1895 data have 33 observations and the 1905 data have 34 
observations. See Appendix Table I for variable definitions and sources. 
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TABLE 7: 
OLS & IV REGRESSIONS WITH REGIONAL CONTROLS 

























































































































































































Panel B: First Stage for Current Institutions and Governors’ Salaries 


























































































































































































Notes: Panel A reports the two-stage least squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2000 (PPP basis) as the 
dependent variable.  Panel B reports the corresponding first-stage regression estimates.  Both samples exclude India and 
Pakistan.  The regressions using the British sample have 40 observations; the regressions using the Full Sample have 65 
observations.  In all specifications, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Notes: All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors.  In column (1) the rule of law variable is 
regressed on Diplomatic Salary.  In columns (2) through (4) the C.D.A.C. data are regressed on log 
(governor’s salary) in 1913.  In all specifications, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  The Diplomatic data come from the Foreign Office List and Diplomatic Consular Year 




































































Notes: All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors.   The log (governor’s salary) in 1913 is 
regressed on population density in 1891.  
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APPENDIX I: DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
Log GDP per Capita, 2000  Purchasing Power Parity Basis.  From Heston et al. 
(2006). 
 
Ethnic Diversity  Average value of five different indices of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization.  Values range from 0 to 1 with higher 
values indicating a higher probability that two randomly 
selected individuals will not speak the same language.  
From La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
Latitude  Absolute value of the country’s latitude.  From La Porta 
et al. (1999). 
 
Rule-of-Law  Varies from -2.5 (weakest institutions) to +2.5 (strongest 
institutions).  From Kaufman et al. (2003). 
 
Government Effectiveness  Varies from -2.5 (weakest institutions) to +2.5 (strongest 
institutions).  From Kaufman et al. (2003). 
 
Governor’s Salary  Salaries represent base salary plus allowances, 
denominated in the current value of British pounds 
sterling.  British salaries from Colonial Office (1885; 
1890; 1895; 1900; 1905; 1913; 1921; 1925; 1930; and 
1935).  European salaries based on data from Gann and 
Duignan (1978).   
 
British Civil Honors  The number of civil honors awarded to a governor, 
weighted by their level of prestige.  There are twelve 
classes of honors—the highest class is given a weight of 
12.  From Great Britain. Colonial Office (1915; 1921; 
1925; 1930; 1935). 
 
Colonial Dummies  Dummy indicating whether the colony was acquired by 
the French or English.  From Henige (1970). 
 
‘Late’ Colony  Dummy variable indicating if colony was acquired after 
1850. British data from P.J. Marshall (2001); European 
data from Henige (1970). 
 
‘High’ Diplomatic Salary  Dummy variable indicating whether diplomatic salary 
was greater than ₤2000.  From Great Britain (1935). 
 
Number of Applications  Number of applications submitted by British governors 
for external colonial funds during 1929-39.  From 
Meredith (1975).  
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APPENDIX I: DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES CONTINUED 
Success Rate  Percentage of applications to C.D.A.C. during 1929-39 
that resulted in external funding.  From Meredith (1975). 
 
Grants per Capita  The value of grants awarded to colonies between 1929 
and 1939, expressed in per capita terms.  From Meredith 
(1975). 
 
Population Density, 1891  Population divided by area in square miles.  From Great 
Britain. Colonial Office (1937). 
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  43